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Nearly ten years ago, seventy-five distinguished students of American 
history participated in a poll measuring the performance of thirty-one 
presidents from George Washington to Dwight Eisenhower. Each par-
ticipant in the poll helped to place the presidents into five general 
categories: "Great/' "Near Great," "Average," "Below Average," and 
"Failure." One of the surprise rankings was the "Near Great" mark 
accorded to Harry Truman, ninth on the list. Only the five "Great" 
presidents—Lincoln, Washington, Franklin Roosevelt, Wilson and Jeffer-
son—and three "Near Great" executives—Jackson, Theodore Roosevelt 
and Polk—preceded Truman. John Adams and Grover Cleveland, who 
immediately followed Truman, completed the "Near Great" group. 
What qualities and achievements elevated Truman above many other 
presidents? He was, according to these historians, a strong executive who 
acted masterfully and farsightedly in foreign affairs. Summarizing the 
poll for his fellow historians, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Sr. noted that Tru-
man "discharged impressively the awesome obligations devolving on the 
United States as the leader of the free world in the cold war with Soviet 
Imperialism." The Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the Berlin 
airlift, the Point Four program and the intervention in Korea "all con-
stituted landmarks in an assumption of global responsibilities undreamed 
of only a few years before." Yet, less than a decade after the poll, this 
estimate is being dramatically challenged by historians of the cold war.1 
A recent book sharply critical of cold war policies as well as Truman's 
role is Rexford G. Tugwell's Off Course: From Truman to Nixon. Be-
cause of Tugwell's credentials—he was a member of Roosevelt's "Brain 
Trust" and he is the winner of two major prizes for the writing of 
history—his latest book demands serious attention. Using Roosevelt's 
record and his probable postwar plans as a measure, Tugwell weighs the 
presidents who came after F.D.R. and, except for Kennedy who had too 
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little time, he finds them wanting; Eisenhower and Johnson but especi-
ally Truman allowed the nation to go "off course." "It had taken only 
two years after Roosevelt's death, and with Truman's mismanagement," 
Tugwell writes, "to turn two great victorious allied powers into aggres-
sive enemies."2 Far from praising the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall 
Plan as masterful or farsighted, Tugwell condemns them as the start of 
the costly and ineffective policy of containment. Although Tugwell 
admits that Truman cannot be blamed alone for the vast misfortunes of 
containment, he holds him responsible for the early phases of the cold 
war, when the U.S.S.R. and China became America's enemies. That, 
Tugwell feels, "may be the most serious criticism that can be made of 
any American President except Buchanan, who allowed the Civil War 
to develop." Truman "was the President who kept on his desk that in-
scribed motto saying 'the buck stops here.' He cannot be exonerated; 
nor, to do him justice, would he want to be."3 
Truman falls unfortunately short as Tugwell contrasts him with 
Roosevelt. Roosevelt understood the Russian wartime trauma, Tugwell 
insists, and he shared the Soviet fear of German recovery. Thus he al-
lowed the Russians to fight the last battle for Berlin and he suggested 
the four-power occupation in order to keep Germany in disciplined sub-
jection for as long as necessary. Other questions having to do with 
Eastern Europe remained to be settled, but Roosevelt felt he could 
handle them even though he foresaw a difficult time with the Russians, 
weary from war and suspicious of their capitalist allies. It was F.D.R.'s 
great attribute, says Tugwell, that he was an experimenter, not much 
worried if things went wrong temporarily. Roosevelt felt that something 
else could be tried until a tolerable situation was achieved. But when 
Roosevelt suddenly died Truman was "hopelessly unready." He had 
neither Roosevelt's sympathetic knowledge of Russian fears nor the 
ability to handle situations in flux. Indeed, nothing was tentative to the 
new president. "Truman not only considered any decision final, but 
belligerently regarded this as a virtue. It was his executive method. The 
way he put it was that he slept well after it was done and woke up to 
something else."4 For Roosevelt, on the other hand, nothing was ever 
quite done; adjustments always had to be made. If Truman did not 
explicitly abandon Roosevelt's conception, Tugwell asserts that he did 
nothing to effectuate it. Almost from the outset of his presidency, Tru-
man showed that implacable hostility toward the U.S.S.R. that "became 
the central principle of American policy in direct contravention of the 
Roosevelt strategy he professed to be following."5 
Tugwell believes that Truman made five egregious mistakes, all of 
which reversed Roosevelt's policy and led to the cold war.6 The first 
mistake was the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Naga-
saki. Tugwell suspects that issues other than Japanese defeat entered 
into the calculations to use the bomb. Perhaps the bomb was approved 
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more easily because the Japanese were not white. Or perhaps it was 
used to prevent the Russians from participating in the Japanese defeat. 
Whatever the reasons, "they cannot have rested on saving American lives 
as Truman would persist in saying to the end of his life." 
Disarmament was the second mistake. In the effort to control nuclear 
weapons, the opportunity to reach agreement was wasted as the Ameri-
cans, who could have afforded to be generous, were instead irreversibly 
offensive. So the time passed when the threat of nuclear war might have 
been contained. "Opportunity for a mistake of this colossal size is not 
given to many men," Tugwell comments. "It was given to Truman, and 
it must be said that he made the most of it." 
Containment is the third mistake since, Tugwell suggests, such policies 
as NATO only provided the Soviet Union with reason to build a vast 
new military, to hold tight to Eastern Europe and to penetrate into other 
areas in the Mediterranean and Asia. It might be, Tugwell concludes, 
that from the Russian view containment can be seen as a favorable policy. 
Korea, the fourth mistake, was strategically unsound. Probably the 
Russians were not challenging the United States in this area which was 
only on the periphery of the American sphere of influence. But Ameri-
can intervention occurred under such a misapprehension, an error that 
ended as an occupation which had to be maintained for years. 
Finally, Tugwell feels that assisting the French in Indo-China was 
Truman's fifth mistake. In Asia the pursuit of containment began by 
helping the French to re-establish their colonial power as the Japanese 
withdrew from Indo-China. In terms of what Roosevelt hoped to accom-
plish, Tugwell feels that this was about as complete a reversal as could 
possibly be imagined. 
Could Truman's mistakes have been avoided? Yes, says Tugwell, if it 
is assumed that Russia and China could have been induced to remain 
allies for peace as they had been for war. Even if Roosevelt had been 
unable to deal sensitively with the Russians, Tugwell is certain that 
"Truman did not—and all his life was proud that he had not conceded 
anything."7 Furthermore, the policy of confrontation with Russia, once 
begun, proved difficult for Truman's successors to abandon. Its costs by 
1970 were a hundred thousand American lives and over a hundred 
billion dollars, a price hardly worthwhile, Tugwell insists, if it is 
suspected that Roosevelt, or other statesmen, might have made it un-
necessary. "Seldom had people paid a higher price in dissension at 
home and lost opportunity abroad for decisions made in pursuit of futile 
aims."8 
There exists a marked contrast between Tugwell's critical position in 
1971 and those orthodox histories of the cold war written in the late 
1940's and the 1950's. The Soviet-American tensions of those years seemed 
to support the official version of the cold war—that Russia was aggressive 
and that American firmness was therefore necessary. The breakdown of 
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the Yalta agreements which had promised postwar cooperation, Russia's 
unwillingness to grant free elections in Eastern Europe, the menace to 
Greece, the coup in Czechoslovakia and the Berlin crisis lent credence to 
the idea that communist ideology and ruthlessness were responsible for 
the break between East and West after 1945. 
While the orthodox version of the cold war stemmed partly from 
events abroad, it came as well from the liberal reaction to right-wing 
domestic politics. The fall of nationalist China and the Alger Hiss case 
added weight to Senator Joseph McCarthy's charges of subversion in the 
Roosevelt-Truman administrations. The right-wing accusation was that 
America was losing the cold war either because the Russians had duped 
American leaders or because traitors had betrayed the United States. 
Liberal historians felt, however, that the right-wing wrongly assumed 
that American actions were decisive in shaping the postwar world when 
from the beginning the initiative in the cold war had been in Moscow. 
The war itself, and particularly the need for Russian assistance, had left 
the U.S.S.R. in its dominant position in Eastern Europe. Nothing 
Roosevelt did at Yalta, or Truman at Potsdam, could have altered 
Russia's determined course. Containment was, therefore, not only a 
logical response to Soviet aggression, it was also a most successful post-
war decision. 
Another factor contributing to the orthodox interpretation of the 
cold war was the conservative view of the American past that came to 
dominate historical writing during the 1950's. Historians of that genera-
tion found consensus and continuity in the American story and, along 
with other intellectuals, they celebrated the accomplishments of demo-
cratic capitalism and of a liberalism that seemed to have triumphed 
dramatically during the New Deal. As one historian has noted: "In their 
work, as well as in their public activities, some [liberals] even came to 
identify the protection of freedom with the advancement of the state's 
interests."9 
Illustrative of the historians of the Fifties, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. has 
reminisced recently about his mood when in 1949 he wrote The Vital 
Center.10 " . . . in the early stages of the Marshall Plan," he says, "I was 
still filled with the excitement engendered by that brilliant, generous and 
now, alas, forgotten undertaking. Moreover, the astonishing re-election 
of President Truman in November 1948 re-inforced one's belief in the 
prospects of liberal democracy; we regarded this as a triumphant vindi-
cation, against all odds and predictions, of Franklin Roosevelt's New 
Deal." Schlesinger also recalls that at the same time the onset of the cold 
war forced the American liberal community to confront the phenomenon 
of communism with more precision and responsibility than it had done. 
He wonders, too, whether the members of the younger generation who 
read The Vital Center will be surprised at the concern devoted to the 
problem of communism. If so, he says, they must make the effort to put 
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themselves back into the historical situation of the 1940's. "Perhaps," 
Schlesinger suggests, "it would help if, every time they see the word 'com-
munism' in this book, they would read 'Stalinism/ " Stalin was running 
a cruel and terrifying dictatorship and "communism in the 1970s is a 
very different thing from communism in the 1940s." Schlesinger is well 
aware that in the 1950's obsessive anti-communism seized portions of the 
American government, and blinded many American leaders to the sig-
nificance of the break-up of the world communist movement which led 
the United States into "the frightful catastrophe of the Viet Nam War." 
But he still believes that it is essential to distinguish between rational 
and obsessive anti-communism. "I note in the new generation a tendency 
to regard anti-communism as per se an evil," Schlesinger writes. "I can 
only say that I have not the slightest regret for the campaign my con-
temporaries waged against Stalinism 
The orthodox interpretation of the 1950's still appears in the main in 
such widely read textbooks as those of John Lukacs and John Spanier, 
and since 1965 Charles Burton Marshall, Dexter Perkins and David Rees 
have continued to express the conventional view of the cold war.11 But 
other historians have rejected various aspects of the official doctrine. 
Following the example of the "realist" school of history established in 
George F. Kennan's American Diplomacy (1951), these historians ques-
tion the fears and assumptions that guided United States policy.12 They 
are critical of the legalistic-moralistic American tradition which pre-
vented American leaders from understanding balance-of-power politics. 
In particular, they feel that American policy-makers did not understand 
that Stalin was more of a realist, determined to follow a spheres-of-in-
fluence policy, than he was an expansionist. Furthermore, containment 
lacked clear objectives which led the United States to overextend itself 
in a new policy of globalism after the Korean War. Nevertheless, these 
historians accept the basic premise of American policy after 1945, that 
containment was a proper response to communist aggression. They are 
critical, not radical historians. 
In disagreement with the realist and orthodox historians are a num-
ber of revisionists who have indicted the United States for precipitating 
the cold war. They follow the lead of Denna Fleming who attributed 
Soviet suspicion and misbehavior to western aggressiveness in his book 
The Cold War and Its Origins, 1917-1950 (1961). These revisionists 
emphasize that the justification for containment, the Soviet menace, did 
not exist at war's end and that weakness dictated Russian cooperation 
with the West. Of course, western leaders, implacably hostile toward 
communism, could not see the reality of Stalin's position, that as an ally 
Russia had the right to ask for friendly buffer states on her eastern 
border. Rather than accommodate the Russians, then, the United States 
used its overwhelming power to protest Russian hegemony in Eastern 
Europe and thereby placed Stalin in a defensive position which left him 
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no choice but to accept the cold war. Furthermore for revisionists, who 
see a definite relationship between American domestic needs and her 
foreign policy, American imperialism is largely responsible for the cold 
war. The Soviet-American confrontation followed American efforts to 
expand into various areas of the world, especially Eastern Europe, in 
order to meet domestic economic demands. 
This reduction of the cold war to economic causes has produced a 
more radical interpretation of American history. For some revisionists 
their criticism of American foreign policy is part of their réévaluation of 
domestic liberal institutions. They find both anti-communist action 
abroad and reform efforts at home to be the natural result of an in-
dustrial society attempting to rationalize its own corporate capitalism. 
One important expression is that of William Appleman Williams in 
The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (1959). Williams argues that the 
United States since 1898 has deliberately continued the "open door" 
policy of extending American influence around the world. Since capital-
ism must have ever-expanding foreign markets to survive, this has even 
meant the expansion of the "open door" principle into areas under Soviet 
control. The cold war, then, is only the latest phase in the whole course 
of twentieth-century American diplomacy. 
At first, Williams' radicalism alienated the academic establishment, 
but his influence on other revisionists has become undeniably significant. 
David Horowitz in The Free World Colossus: A Critique of American 
Foreign Policy in the Cold War (1965), in basic agreement with 
Williams, characterizes American policy as counterrevolutionary because 
it was committed to the defense of a global status quo. He judges that 
the main purpose of containment was to crush any radical movement 
from threatening the will of the United States. In Gabriel Kolko's The 
Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945 
(1968), policies that once appeared enlightened—the Marshall Plan for 
European recovery and the Point Four program for aid to underde-
veloped countries—seem almost imperialistic. He feels that the cold war 
arose because Russia refused to let Eastern Europe become a part of the 
American colonial system. The disquieting theme that the origins of the 
cold war lie in atomic blackmail elevates Gar Alperovitz's Atomic Diplo-
macy: Hiroshima and Potsdam (1965) to an influential place among re-
visionist histories.13 Although his critique of liberal institutions is less 
radical than others, his careful scholarship adds strength to his conclu-
sion that Truman got tough with Russia because the atomic bomb 
strengthened his hand. Truman even delayed his trip to Potsdam until 
the atomic bomb was developed, Alperovitz believes, in order to use the 
power of the new weapon to influence the Soviet Union.14 
The nature of such criticism has understandably brought forth a sharp 
reaction. One historian, William W. McDonald, has complained that 
revisionists are guilty of reversing the roles of heroes and villains in the 
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cold war. The revisionists "suffer from what one might describe as ideo-
logical myopia: American diplomats can do no right; Russian leaders can 
do no wrong." He also feels that the theme of America's "Open Door 
'imperial expansion' " is highly debatable and that the revisionists have 
not shown that postwar coexistence could have been anything but 
antagonistic. Irwin Unger has called the revisionists bad-tempered, angry 
dissenters from America's current foreign and domestic policies. Charles 
S. Maier feels that the Marxian basis of the third-world perspective has 
serious analytical deficiencies. The cold war represents to revisionists "a 
continuation of an international civil war in which Russian and later 
peasant revolutionary forces have successfully championed the cause of 
the oppressed in all countries, while the United States has become the 
leader of the world's elites." This, he asserts, overestimates the fragility 
of the capitalist order and overvalues the American contribution to 
counterrevolution as well as the will to impose it. Arthur Schlesinger, 
Jr. announced that the time had come to blow the whistle before the 
outburst of revisionism regarding the origins of the cold war went much 
further. But he could not "blow the whistle," says Christopher Lasch. 
Schlesinger backed away somewhat from his position, admitting that 
although the revisionist interpretations did not really stick, revisionism 
was a necessary part of the historical process. ". . . it is good to know," 
chides Lasch, "that revisionists may now presumably continue their work 
(inconsequential as it may eventually prove to be) without fear of being 
whistled to a stop by the referee."15 
Revisionists have, indeed, continued their work because the forces 
behind the reappraisal of American foreign policy and the origins of 
the cold war are so great. Much of the impact on revisionists comes 
from the Vietnam war, which is for these historians the logical and un-
fortunate outcome of American cold war policy. As Charles S. Maier 
suggests, Vietnam has so eroded national self-conceptions that many as-
sumptions behind traditional cold war history have been cast into 
doubt.16 Also important as an influence on revisionists is their conviction 
that there is a moral issue in Vietnam. One historian has written: "The 
United States Government has tried hard to cover its moral nakedness 
in Vietnam. But the signs of failure grow day by day."17 
What history is and what role the historian should play have an 
important bearing on the revisionist critique of the cold war. Revisionists 
are convinced that the writing of history should not be used, as they feel 
it has since World War II, to buttress American policy; that has led to a 
distortion of research. Revisionists look instead, notes Walter LaFeber, 
for a vision of the past that will help them remake the present and the 
future. They hope, too, that history will offer a reinforcement of current 
moral values. "A faith in history is perhaps the most important and far-
reaching of the revisionist views," LaFeber writes.18 
A striking example of the revisionist concern for the proper use of 
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history is Howard Zinn's The Politics of History (1970), which calls for 
"a higher proportion of socially relevant, value-motivated, action-induc-
ing historical work." ". . . in a world where children are still not safe 
from starvation or bombs," Zinn asks, "should not the historian thrust 
himself and his writing into history, on behalf of goals in which he deeply 
believes? Are we historians not humans first, and scholars because of 
that?"1» 
Zinn deplores the dominant mood in historical writing in the United 
States which avoids direct confrontation of contemporary problems. 
Out of the enormous energy devoted to the past, only a tiny amount is 
directed to the solution of vital problems. Look at the pages of the 
historical reviews, Zinn admonishes, or at the tens of thousands of his-
torical scholars who gather annually to hear hundreds of papers on 
scattered topics yet, "there has been no move to select a problem—poverty, 
race prejudice, the war in Vietnam, alternative methods of social change 
—for concentrated attention by some one conference."20 Historians must 
challenge the rules which sustain the wasting of knowledge. No longer, 
Zinn maintains, can historians hide behind "disinterested scholarship" 
and "objectivity" and "publish while others perish." Historians, Zinn 
says, need to become critics rather than apologists and perpetrators of 
their culture.21 
Zinn offers five ways in which history can be useful for those who 
"would rather have their writing guided by human aspiration than by 
professional habit."22 History is not inevitably useful, Zinn admits, "But 
history can untie our minds, our bodies, our disposition to move—to en-
gage life rather than contemplating it as an outsider." It can make us 
aware of the silent voices of the past and the present; it "can reveal how 
ideas are stuffed into us by the powers of our time. . . . " And, Zinn adds, 
history "can inspire us by recalling those few moments in the past when 
men did behave like human beings, to prove it is possible."23 The guide-
lines for revisionist history which Zinn offers support LaFeber's conten-
tion that history is the way out for intellectuals who want change yet 
think it improbable in the near future.24 The issue between revisionist 
and other historians of the cold war is not the thoroughness of research. 
"Our values should determine the questions we ask in scholarly inquiry," 
Zinn states, "but not the answers."25 
The age and educational experience of a number of leading revision-
ists also figure in their approach to history. Coming to intellectual 
maturity during the cold war, young historians broke with the consensus 
of the 1950's as they became aware of poverty, racism, civil rights and 
Vietnam. One such group published essays in vigorous criticism of the 
historical consensus in Towards a New Past: Dissenting Essays in Ameri-
can History, edited by Barton J. Bernstein. At the time of the book's 
publication in 1967, the average age of the eleven contributors was only 
thirty-three. The authors sought explicitly "to make the past speak to 
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the present, to ask questions that have a deep-rooted moral and political 
relevance.' ' " . . . we have, by necessity," Bernstein wrote, "moved beyond 
objective history to the realm of values. In this venture we are following 
the practice, though not necessarily the prescription, of earlier genera-
tions of historians, and responding in a modest way to the call issued a 
few years ago to move 'beyond consensus/ "26 
Some of the young revisionists of the 1960's reflect the influence of 
the so-called "Wisconsin School" of history. For instance, Gar Alperovitz, 
Lloyd C. Gardner, David Horowitz, Gabriel Kolko, Walter LaFeber and 
Robert F. Smith27 received at least some of their training at the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin, where William Appleman Williams taught history. 
LaFeber suggests that part of the revisionist-orthodox split is along 
Eastern-Midwestern lines, and both he and Bernstein believe revisionists 
have been influenced by Midwestern populism and progressivism. Like 
Charles Beard, historian of an earlier generation, young revisionists 
trained or reared in the Midwest, stress the impact of domestic economics 
on foreign policy, applaud the influence of public opinion on policy-
making, condemn the concentration of power in a strong presidency and 
emphasize the relevance of history to the present.28 
That the impact of the revisionist position is upon us is evidenced 
by many of the books displayed at the recent American Historical As-
sociation convention. Revisionism is in paperback as well as in anthology 
form, and it is sure to infiltrate history courses even at the introductory 
level. An excellent example of a collection is that edited by James V. 
Compton, America and the Origins of the Cold War (1972), which 
presents the views of both orthodox and revisionist historians. Trends 
and Tragedies in American Foreign Policy (1971), edited by Michael 
Parenti, examines "some long-muted dissenting notions and heretical 
views about the intent, purposes, and unhappy consequences of Ameri-
can foreign policy and the interests that shape that policy." Loren Baritz, 
general editor of Wiley's "Problems in American History," has added 
to that series Walter LaFeber, éd., The Origins of the Cold War, 1941-
1947 (1971). Irwin Unger has a broad scope in his collection, Beyond 
Liberalism: The New Left Views American History (1971). A unique 
anthology is that edited by Thomas G. Paterson, Cold War Critics: 
Alternatives to American Foreign Policy in the Truman Years (1971). 
This is the first book to explore the beliefs and ideas of those who chal-
lenged American foreign policy during the early years of the cold war. 
A book that focuses on individual policymakers during the cold war is 
Lloyd C. Gardner, Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American 
Foreign Policy, 1941-1949 (1970). Two new works which approach the 
origins of the cold war by reassessing Truman's rhetoric and policy de-
cisions are Richard M. Freeland, The Truman Doctrine and the Origins 
of McCarthy ism: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and Internal Security, 
1946-1948 (1971), and Athan Theoharis, Harry S. Truman and the 
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Origins of McCarthyism (1971). Two other books, soon to be published 
in 1972, which promise to add to the revisionist critique are Jerald A. 
Combs, éd., Nationalist, Realist, and Radical: Three Views of American 
Diplomacy, and Joyce Kolko and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: 
The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954. These are but 
some of the current books which indicate the growing popularity of the 
revisionist assessment of the cold war. 
The forces behind revisionism—the Vietnam war, the youth of critics, 
the new faith in history as a tool for change—have challenged the ortho-
dox consensus, producing a great historiographical debate that will con-
tinue! New historians, trained in the late 1960's and 1970's, a period of 
rampant social unrest, are likely to accept revisionism, as LaFeber be-
lieves, not as an aberration but as logical and as fact. Christopher Lasch 
is sure, too, that increasingly William Appleman Williams, so influential 
on the radicals of the 1960's as well as on other revisionists, will become 
uncomfortable among those historians who demand that America 
rapidly rid itself of racism, poverty, imperialistic wars and ecological 
problems which threaten posterity. Whatever the specific course of argu-
ment, in the foreseeable future historians will have to come to grips with 
revisionism which has shattered so many of the assumptions of traditional 
cold war history. 
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